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Abstract
Our study critically surveys financial inclusion in Latin American and Caribbean countries, gauging
access to both credit and deposit accounts by poor households. Our review confirms some pieces of 
conventional wisdom in this area, but challenges some others. Regarding the latter, we claim that
(a) Limited financial inclusion does not simply follows from unfair discrimination against the poor, 
but to a great deal from a low demand for financial services and scarce access for the population at 
large. In this sense, we argue that supply-side constraints have a second-order importance; (b) 
Despite the impressive progress of microfinance in recent years, stakeholders should avoid over-
optimism, rooted in an apparent over-advertisement of a few successful cases. While a potentially 
powerful tool to fight poverty, microcredit must be carefully targeted, and granted by highly 
specialized intermediaries under commercially-oriented criteria; (c) Although financial inclusion is 
a social matter, the private sector has provided more and better responses than the public sector. 
Furthermore, these private programs have proven to be quite profitable; (d) Recent experiences in 
several LAC countries hint that governments can play a decisive role in coordinating financial 
inclusion initiatives, leading normative changes, and supporting innovative banking outreach 
strategies without engaging directly in credit allocation; and (e) Governments, donors and 
intermediaries should make coordinated efforts to assemble microdata and encourage sound impact 
evaluations comparable across countries and time. A number of policy recommendations emerge 
from the analysis.
(*) Document prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank - Poverty and Inequality Unit. I’d like to 
acknowledge the support and insights from Luis Tejerina, who was the IDB technical counterpart to this 
project. I also much appreciate the invaluable help of Gabriel Schneider, Juan Padilla,  Terry McKinley, Fabio 
Veras, Victoria Fazio, Christine Ternent, Diego Aulestia and María Clara Hoyos for providing valuable 
information on ongoing programs in the region. Máximo Sangiácomo did an excellent job as research 
assistant. The usual disclaimer applies. Comments are most welcome at ricardo.bebczuk@gmail.com.
INDEX
    Page
Introduction …………………………………………………………………  3      
Section 1: Access to Financial Services by Poor Households 
in Latin America and the Caribbean ………………………………………  4 
Section 2: Microcredit
2.1 Impact Evaluation ……………………………………………………….   7
2.2 Regulation and Supervision …………………………………………….   12
2.3 MFI Performance Indicators …………………………………………...   13
2.4 Case Studies in Microfinance in LAC: Lessons from Experience ……  15
Box: The Role of Credit Registries. The Case of 
Red Financiera Rural (Ecuador) ……………………………………………… 20
Section 3: Banking the Unbanked in Latin America and the Caribbean
3.1 Benefits of and Barriers to Financial Inclusion ………………………..  22
3.2 State Programs …………………………………………………………...  27
3.3 Case Studies ………………………………………………………………  30
Box: Saving Arrangements for the Poor ……………………………………… 27
Conclusions and Main Lessons ……………………………………………...  38
References …………………………………………………………………….  44
Tables ………………………………………………………………………….  52
Introduction
Financial inclusion refers to the delivery of financial services –encompassing credit, 
savings, payments, remittances, insurance, and others- to disadvantaged and low income 
groups at an affordable cost. Our paper will critically review the extent of and the 
conventional wisdom about financial inclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
the ultimate goal of drawing lessons on best practices and proposing fruitful avenues for 
policy design and further research. In view of their relative importance and the data at hand, 
most of the analysis will focus on the access to credit and to banking accounts. Futhermore, 
for the sake of expositional clarity, credit and deposit facilities will be treated separately, 
although a few cross references will of course come up along the way.
The document will be organized as follows. Section 1 will motivate the study by advancing 
statistics on access to financial services among the poor. Section 2 will be devoted to the 
microcredit industry, the most promising and dynamic mechanism for financial inclusion 
from the credit side in recent years. After delineating the defining features of microcredit, 
this section will go over the evidence on impact evaluation, regulation, performance of 
microfinance institutions (henceforth, MFIs), and practical lessons from the experience of 
ten mature MFIs in the region. Afterwards, Section 3 will focus on transaction and saving 
deposits, highlighting the achievements and shortcomings of official financial inclusion 
mechanisms, and describing a number of innovative and successful public and private 
programs. The lessons drawn from the review will close.
Section 1: Access to Financial Services by Poor Households in Latin America and the 
Caribbean
The few available figures attest to an insufficient financial outreach to the poor in Latin 
American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries. National household surveys conducted in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s are our primary data source. Table 1 shows for 8 countries in the 
region that only 10.1% of households receive credit of any kind, and this percentage 
slightly declines to 9.5% when it comes to poor households. In the latter case, the range 
goes from a minimum of 3% in Peru for 2002 to a maximum of 27.3% in Ecuador for 2005. 
In turn, Table 2 gives account of a small average loan size for another subset of countries: 
the amount of credit represents 23.3% for all households and 20.2% for poor ones.1 Table 3 
displays the fraction of total and poor households having credit and saving accounts with 
formal financial institutions in 12 countries. According to the weighted average, 6.3% of 
total households have credit and 18% owns a deposit account, and these values fall to 4.5% 
and 10% for poor households. While low from both sides, the larger fraction accessing the 
deposit market just reflects the fact that lending is typically easier than borrowing. For 
microenterprises, the fraction with access to credit is a modest 5.7%, with a maximum of 
18.7% in Uruguay and a minimum of 0.7% in Honduras (see Table 4). 
From a more international perspective, Table 5 shows the number of loan and deposit 
accounts in the formal banking system in LAC countries and in other 180 developed and 
developing countries.2 For LAC, there are 131 loan accounts and 432 deposit accounts per 
1,000 people. This implies quite a low participation in financial markets, and even more so 
if it is likely that some people possess more than just one account. As expected, the number 
of deposit accounts is three times larger than that of loan accounts. LAC fares slightly 
better in loans and worse in deposits with respect to other developing economies, but more 
interesting is the comparison to the subset of developed countries, where the average is 321 
                                                
1 For comparison, Beck et al. (2007) find that the loan-income ratio in OECD commercial banks is 3.5.
2 Tejerina and Westley (2007) show that the share of population with access to credit in other developing 
regions does not differ much from the LAC figures, with a maximum of 8.4% in Asia and a minimum of 4.1% 
in Africa. In terms of deposits, the transition countries rank at the bottom with 17.6% and Asia leads again 
with 37.1%. For comparison, 90% of population has a deposit account in OECD countries (no data is 
available on credit). 
loan and 1862 deposit accounts, indicating that: (i) LAC lags well behind developed 
economies in terms of financial breadth. This of course is a reflection of financial 
shallowness: on average for the last three decades, the ratio of credit to the private sector to 
GDP is of 33.9% for LAC, 105.3% for high income OECD countries and 73.6% for East 
Asian countries; (ii) Credit access is restricted to a minority even in industrial countries -
only about 30% of the population has a loan in these economies; and (iii) In deep financial 
markets individuals tend to open more than one deposit account -that is why there are 
almost 2,000 accounts per 1,000 people. 
The microfinance hope rests, at first glance, on some impressive figures. For instance, MIX 
(2007) offers end-2006 information on the top 100 MFIs in the region, showing that they 
cover 10.2 million clients with a joint portfolio of US$10,500 million. However, relative 
rather than absolute figures must be examined upon before making any statement about 
credit poverty outreach. For a larger sample of 584 MFIs in the region, the same source 
reports, as seen in Table 6, a combined clientele of 11.2 million, representing a simple 
average of 2.8% of total population and 9% of poor population. These proportions are 
similar across other regions in the world.3
All in all, these data reveal an often neglected fact: while the poor patently seem to be 
excluded from the credit market, and to a lesser extent from the deposit market, they are not 
much more so than the population at large. The previous figures should not come as a 
surprise after recalling that LAC countries display very shallow credit markets. 
Aggregate numbers are not enough to determine whether poor households are unfairly 
discriminated in financial markets. Navajas and Tejerina (2006) and Bebczuk (2004) make 
a strong case about the need to distinguish demand and supply factors in explaining the 
scarcity of credit – some entrepreneurs may not demand external funding, be it due to lack 
of good investment opportunities, adequate internal funding, risk aversion, or lack of 
knowledge (or mere apathy) about financial alternatives. Although it is hard to make this 
                                                
3 Incidentally, it can be noticed that the top 100 sample is a highly representative group, as it covers 91% of 
the broader sample of 584 MFIs.
notion operational, disregarding it might lead to the overestimation of the actual degree of 
financial constraint. On the supply side, as forcefully argued by IDB (2008), World Bank 
(2007) and Beck et al. (2007), exclusion from both the deposit and the credit markets for 
poor households is often associated to the inability to meet usual bank requirements such as 
the payment of high transaction costs and minimum balances, as well as proof of personal 
documentation and formal employment –we will resume this discussion in Section 3. 
Ultimately, the problem stems from the usual asymmetric information syndrome: borrowers 
have better information and control over the projects and enjoy limited liability on their 
unpaid debts, which in turn encourage debtors to disguise the actual risk of their projects 
(adverse selection), to apply the funds to riskier projects than the ones agreed upon with the 
creditor (moral hazard) and to falsely declare default. As a conflict of interest unravels 
jeopardizing their expected returns, uninformed creditors react by requiring more 
documentation on the project and the entrepreneur, raising the cost of capital (or plainly 
rationing it), shortening the repayment period, and asking for collateral and cofinancing. 
All in all, this self-protective behavior ends up undermining access to credit to many 
potential borrowers, but especially to the smaller and more opaque ones.
Section 2: Microcredit
The term microcredit labels the provision of small-scale loans to poor borrowers. These 
loans, most generally, are extended for business (as opposed to consumption) purposes and 
normally charge market-level interest rates. They are also typically collateral-free, targeted 
to female household heads, and are based on non-traditional repayment incentive devices 
such as group lending (see Karlan and Golderg (2006)).4 This section goes over the 
development of this instrument in LAC and tackles a few unsettled issues, such as the
impact on key social and economic variables, the arguments for and against regulation, the 
industry performance, and some lessons from the experience of successful MFIs in the 
region. 
2.1 Impact Evaluation
Impact evaluations are aimed to measure how a microfinance program affects income, 
education, health and other welfare indicators of those enrolled in it. As they are an 
essential tool to assess commercial profitability, operational efficiency, and poverty 
outreach and alleviation, these exercises are of utmost importance for private and social 
parties, including MFI managers, international donors, and local policymakers. 
A priori, credit can help improve income growth prospects by boosting either the volume or 
the productivity of investment. For financially constrained households, credit may turn out 
to be essential to exploit good productive projects that would otherwise be passed up. On 
top of this, and even for household not facing financial constraints, borrowing can push up 
productivity because: 
(a) Formal and informal lenders screen applicants and select only those with adequate 
repayment ability. This selection process provides free and professional information to the 
                                                
4 Microfinance is a broader concept encompassing other financial services, sometimes attached to the credit 
contract, such as deposit accounts, insurance, and remittances.
very entrepreneur concerning the actual profitability of the project, and should lead them to 
discard those with a bleak outlook; 
(b) The effort devoted to the project may be reinforced in the face of a fixed financial 
obligation and the psychological and pecuniary costs of not fulfilling it, such as reputation 
losses and shutting down of the business; 
(c) Banks are especially well equipped to establish close lending relationships with their 
clients so as to assess the  character and expected cash flows of the borrower. Microfinance 
institutions take fuller advantage of these relationships than formal institutions. Given their 
proximity to the borrowers and a smaller and more manageable loan portfolio, these 
institutions pay frequent visits to the business and household, talking with the entrepreneur 
and their relatives and partners to draw valuable information and prevent in advance 
inefficient and opportunistic decisions on the part of the borrower;5
(d) The microlending technology encompasses a variety of incentive devices to ensure debt 
repayment, such as group lending (all borrowers within each group are held responsible if 
any member defaults), progressive schemes (performing borrowers are granted increasing 
amounts and terms in subsequent rounds of borrowing), and short-term, revolving lending 
to facilitate monitoring. In turn, group lending adopts two possible forms: solidarity groups 
of about 5 members, and village banking, which involve larger groups of up to about 30 
people. Joint liability introduces a self-enforced financial mechanism, which is 
supplemented by the reputational costs of default for individuals living in small 
communities and having scant spacial mobility;6 and 
(e) Most microcredit programs include technical assistance and other supporting learning 
activities that may provide beneficial guidance to entrepreneurs. 
In spite of the expected positive outcome grounded on these arguments, it would be naïve 
to assert that credit will always deliver on its promises. For instance, there could be a moral 
hazard behavior at play, inducing entrepreneurs to divert loans to current consumption 
instead of investment projects, or merely to substitute self-financing for debt. People with 
                                                
5 However, excessive frequency of visits and collective meetings with borrowers may turn out be 
counterproductive and discourage some entrepreneurs from signing up with a microcredit program.
6 Conversely, group lending may create free riding and collusion against the lender, especially in the face of 
systemic shocks.
low education or business skills are equally prone not to make a profitable use of loans or 
to over-borrow, especially in unstable macroeconomic environments. The amount of credit 
the household gets may also influence the observed impact. Small loans (as a fraction of 
current household income) are less likely to help reshape educational and labor choices of 
poor families, provided the additional money does not take them out of the subsistence 
level or do not create any sense of income security. In a similar vein, the borrower is likely 
to make different choices according to the maturity and expected rollover of the loan - for 
instance, he or she will be less inclined to make productive investments when receiving a 
non-renewable, short-term loan.
On more practical grounds, controversy surrounds this issue as two polar visions fail to 
reach a consensus: on one hand, there are practitioners and non-technical microcredit 
advocates that display an almost blind belief in a strongly positive impact; on the other 
hand, there are scholars that have a more pessimistic stand, rooted in rigorous analyses that 
highlight a series of caveats on merely casual evidence, in particular: (a) Microcredit 
supporters often rely on a handful of individual successful stories rather than on a thorough 
program evaluation; (b) The available evidence, even with large borrower samples, is built 
upon already successful programs; (c) Lack of proper control for selection bias 
overestimates the actual impact; and (d) Studies are not fully comparable across programs 
due to differences in methodology, term over which benefits are measured (short- or long-
term), and outcome under analysis (food security, shock response, poverty, income, 
employment, health, education, women empowerment, etc.). 
Ideally, the impact evaluation should compare the situation of a group after receiving credit 
(treatment group) with an identical group in all aspects save for the availability of credit 
(control group). The main methodological challenge is to get around a potential selection 
bias, arising from the fact that the treatment group might have been better off even with no 
access to credit. This may occur because good borrowers are self-selected or because the 
lender targets them. In either case, it would be possible to control for differences in 
observable characteristics such as age, education and gender, but not in unobservable 
attributes such as innate ability, attitude towards risk or entrepreneurial spirit –income may 
improve not solely due to having taken the loan but to some of these attributes. A similar 
case takes place when loans are extended to villages favored by better infrastructure or 
more dynamic sectors; if the control group does not belong to such villages or sector, the 
credit impact will be overstated. Scholars have resorted to different procedures to eliminate 
this endogeneity, but this kind of evidence is still limited and comes in overwhelming 
proportion from Asian case studies.7
Most of the existing evidence uses data from Asian microcredit programs. Studies for Latin 
America are much more scarce. For instance, Montgomery and Weiss (2005), in a survey 
of impact evaluation in both regions, document 14 studies for Asia and 5 for Latin 
America. After an extensive search, we found a total number of 10 academic studies on 
LAC countries, which are listed in Table 7. While in general they uncover a positive impact 
of microcredit on income, poverty and food security, this verdict is not at all unanimous. 
For instance, Aroca (2004) finds positive but fragile income responses in Brazil and Chile, 
Maldonado (2005) claims ambiguous results on education outcomes in Bolivia, and 
Bebczuk and Haimovich (2006), exploiting national household surveys, find a positive and 
significant impact of credit on income in Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, but not in Nicaragua 
and Paraguay, with mixed results on education as well. 
Another open question is whether microcredit has targeted extremely or moderately poor 
households. Hasemi and Rosenberg (2006) admit, based on available evidence, that 
microcredit does not serve the poorest. They attribute this in part to self-selection: very 
poor individuals may believe that taking a financial obligation makes their lives even 
riskier. Also, in group-based MFIs, the other members may be reluctant to jointly guarantee 
the repayment by people in this particularly risky income bracket. For MFIs to stay in 
business it is necessary to keep under tight control the default rate, avoiding excessively 
risky prospects. If some clients start to default, this behavior may rapidly spread over the 
entire loan portfolio, especially when punishment is not harsh enough. Also it weighs in the 
                                                
7 A well-known example is Khandker and Pitt (1998), who study a program in Bangladesh where the only 
elegibility criterion was that the beneficiary owned less than one-half acre of land.
MFI decision the existence of unmet basic needs that can encourage the use of the credit for 
consumption purposes, jeopardizing the ability to repay.
This concise review makes it clear that impact evaluation could be greatly improved in 
LAC by taking note of the following reflections: 
(a) For the most part, the excitement around microfinance in LAC has been based so far 
more on rhetoric than on hard evidence; 
(b) Not only sophisticated, endogeneity-free studies should be deemed as valid hard 
evidence. Although it is desirable to gradually move towards well designed and 
conducted studies, this field is underdeveloped in LAC to the degree that there is even 
scarcity of simple “before and after” exercises on a regular basis for a representative set 
of MFIs. Even if a weaker test than the treatment/control group approach, long time 
series for particular programs would provide very rich information. Overstressing the 
requirement to have an ideal control group may discourage badly needed and less 
complex measurements. Besides, it would be important in time to have an 
approximation to the actual upward bias in the estimations. As a digression, it  is 
striking that while many question the real effect of microfinance, there is an ample 
agreement that the formal banking system promotes economic growth, despite the fact 
that there is no microdata comparable to that used in microcredit impact studies.
(c) Many of the unanswered impact questions to date will be best addressed once 
stakeholders manage to push, support and converge to some broad guidelines on data 
collection and impact methodology. The extraordinary progress observed in collecting 
and making available reliable MFI accounting data should be extended to their 
microdata. In particular, governments and international donors have the correct 
incentives (the social interest) and means (control and funding of MFIs) to make this 
happen. For the time being, efforts haven been driven by inarticulated academic 
initiatives hardly homogeneous in their sample, approach and performance measures. 
2.2 Regulation and Supervision 
Whether to regulate MFIs is a debatable matter. The modern approach to financial 
regulation states that two goals must be pursued: systemic risk minimization and consumer 
protection. Both of them are thought to mitigate market failures: in one case, the negative 
externality from the bankruptcy of individual financial intermediaries on other 
intermediaries and on credit-dependent nonfinancial firms; in the other case, potential non-
competitive behavior and especially the lack of information faced by small depositors prone 
to become fraud victims. 
Based on these premises, it is not fully clear that all MFIs should be regulated, as most of 
them are quite small, informal and do not take deposits from the public. Nevertheless, it is 
indisputable that big, deposit-taking MFIs must be regulated as other formal banks are, 
although an ulterior matter is where to draw the line. This does not necessarily mean that 
the remaining MFIs should go utterly uncontrolled. Consumer protection considerations are 
still present in all cases, especially in profit-maximizing MFIs. In the same spirit, the need 
to have proper account of all financial activity in the country and evaluate their impact on 
income and welfare warrants some overall industry oversight. Hence, deciding the optimal 
degree of regulation requires fine-tuning discrimination across the heterogeneous spectrum 
of MFIs. In particular, for small MFIs, the additional reporting duties and activity 
restrictions may impose costly staff workload and reduced product innovation and outreach. 
As in LAC and other emerging countries financial regulation is focused on systemic risk 
arising from major formal banks, the recommended consumer protection and data 
collection tasks may be commissioned to a more specialized government department within 
or outside the banking regulatory agency. Indeed, specific regulatory guidelines should be 
applied on the sector, in light of the pronounced differences, vis-à-vis formal banks, in loan 
size, clientele profile, interest rate, contractual features, and the like.
The prevalent practice worldwide seems to be in tune with the previous discussion about 
the cons (and not only the pros) of regulation. IMF (2005) notes that MFIs are poorly 
regulated all over the world. ADB (2006) shows, from a survey of 10 Asian countries, that 
NGOs remain unregulated. A CGAP comprehensive regulatory survey confirms that this 
model also applies to LAC countries. According to Table 8, in all 11 countries covered by 
the survey, NGOs are generally unregulated, while cooperatives and credit unions are either 
under the bank regulator orbit (5 cases) or under a specific regulator (6 cases).8
A related issue is the market structure in terms of regulated and unregulated entities. For the 
LAC case, as shown in Table 9, Navajas and Tejerina (2006) find that 71% of a sample of 
337 surveyed MFIs were unregulated as of 2005 (67% in 2001 from a sample of 184 
MFIs). These figures should be taken with caution as regulated entities might be over-
represented in the sample, but they still illustrate the point that MFIs mostly remain outside 
the scope of financial regulation. In turn, regulated MFIs are much larger on average (they 
hold 81% of total portfolio). 
More importantly, downscaling (commercial banks undertaking microfinance businesses) 
and upgrades (formerly unregulated MFIs now under official supervision) had in 2005 a 
similar fraction of the regulated market, with 32% and 37% respectively. This speaks of an 
interesting market dynamics, whereby regulatory coverage is likely to increase over time in 
an endogenous rather than compulsory way: on one hand, already regulated banks enter the 
microfinance industry to exploit attractive business opportunities; on the other hand, some 
previously unregulated MFIs, under pressure by their donors or looking to expand their 
financing by accepting deposits, may decide to abide by the regulatory framework. In other 
words, where microfinance goes, regulation follows, not the other way around. Therefore, 
as MFIs do not pose a threat for systemic stability, as it is largely the case in Latin America, 
there does not seem to exist any urgent need to forcefully and universally regulate this 
market.   
                                                
8 Credit unions are not-for-profit financial cooperatives funded by member savings rather than outside capital. 
All members own the credit union and may run for the board and cast a vote in elections. Their goal is to offer
a wide range of financial services to members at an affordable cost. As of 2006, they have 172 million 
members worldwide, with a penetration of 7.4% of economically active population, and hold a portfolio of 
US$758 billion in loans. For LAC countries, there are 2,330 credit unions in 16 countries (led by Brazil with 
929 institutions and Mexico with 460) that serve 9.2 million members (3.65% of labor force) with a loan 
portfolio of US$10.2 billion (Source: World Council of Credit Unions, www.woccu.org). In spite of these 
impressive figures, little is known about the particular functioning and impact of these financial 
intermediaries, which should certainly be part of the financial inclusion agenda.
2.3 MFI Performance Indicators
This section is devoted to describe major trends in size, structure, outreach, profitability, 
and risk of MFIs in Latin America in 2006. In view of the widespread informality of the 
microfinance business, statistical information on the whole universe of MFIs is hard to 
obtain and made comparable across institutions and time. Fortunately, the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) reports those statistics for a sample of 700 MFIs around the 
world, 228 of which are from LAC.9
Table 10 presents LAC data, accompanied by that from other regions for the sake of 
comparison. For completeness, Tables 11 to 13 report data for each subregion (South 
America, Central America, and the Caribbean) and for each available country. Since no 
obvious differences are detected across regions and countries, we will focus on LAC 
averages. The mean portfolio of US$ 5.7 million, staff of 90 employees, and 8 offices 
confirm the typical small size of these intermediaries. The average portfolio includes about 
10,600 borrowers with a balance of U$S 678. Although the average deposit balance is 
slightly over US$ 700, less than half of the clients hold voluntary deposits, implying that to 
a large extent deposits serve as a sort of cash collateral. 
Both the return on assets (2.1%) and on equity (8.5%) are strong in absolute and 
comparative terms to other regions. As measured by the ratio of financial revenues to assets 
or the real portfolio yield, MFIs charge high loan interest rates close to 30%, even though 
their funding cost (financial expenses to assets) is about 7%. Almost 70% of their liabilities 
is explained by voluntary deposits and commercial borrowing.
In spite of the relatively low cost of funding, MFIs confront high operating costs, which in 
the case of LAC amount to 20.4% of total portfolio and to US$140 per loan. Loan officers 
                                                
9 This presumably is a small fraction of total MFIs operating in the region, and participation in the survey is 
voluntary. Although the sample may not be fully representative of the total number of institutions, it probably 
is of the total portfolio, as the sample covers the largest MFIs. 
are about 53% of total personnel, which is consistent with the relationship-intensive nature 
of microlending. Coupled with their diseconomies of scale, this implies that MFIs are 
forced to lend at above-market rates (taking prime rates in the formal banking system as 
market rates) should they want to attain financial self-sufficiency. Letting along these steep 
costs, it is clear that the low non-performing loan rate (1.8%) remains the greatest and most 
striking success of this financial industry.
Table 14 splits the sample by type of MFI, namely, banks, credit unions, non-bank financial 
institutions, and NGOs, and also by for profit versus non-for-profit institutions. Banks and 
for profit MFIs appear to have much larger portfolios, clientele bases, loan sizes, number of 
offices, and more personnel. Nevertheless, these differences do not clearly translate into 
better performance vis-à-vis peer groups. Although a wider sample of MFIs and over time 
data would be needed to make a sounder statement, these results suggest that the 
organizational structure is not a crucial factor in shaping MFI performance. 
Few studies have tried to unveil regularities between organizational characteristics and 
performance. Navajas, Navarrete, Simbaqueba, Cuevas and Salamanca (2006) use a sample 
of 220 MFIs from 6 LAC countries to show, through regression analysis, that the regulatory 
status (regulated versus unregulated) has no bearing on return, risk or provisions, but non-
bank  MFIs have higher ROA  than banks, while the latter have higher provisions. As no 
statistically significant difference in loan quality exists between both groups, the evidence 
indicates that non-bank institutions have a better risk-adjusted performance. Another 
positive development observable in their dataset is that only 10% of the MFIs experienced 
losses, meaning that financial self-sufficiency is an entirely realistic goal for the industry.  
In turn, Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch (2005) employ information on 124 MFIs from 
49 countries to conclude that outreach and self-sufficiency are fully compatible in the sense 
that higher interest rates can go hand in hand with high repayment rates and returns. These 
results weaken somewhat for MFIs specialized in individual-based lending (as opposed to 
group and village lending), for which performance worsen for sufficiently high interest 
rates. This is likely to occur because of the lack of a peer pressure-based enforcement 
device.
2.4 Case Studies in Microfinance in LAC: Lessons from Experience
Over and above the theoretical arguments for and against microfinance, much of the buzz 
about the industry is rooted in successful case studies. Although such small samples suffer
from evident selection bias, it is nonetheless a useful starting point to identify some of their 
crucial singularities and draw lessons for the future. Ten case studies in the field from 
different countries in LAC are examined: BancoEstado y Bandesarrollo (Chile), 
Compartamos (Mexico), BancoSol, Banco Los Andes y FIE (Bolivia), Crediamigo (Brazil), 
Banco Caja Social (Colombia), Credife (Ecuador) y Mibanco (Peru). The choice was not 
guided by any particular criterion except for the fact that they are all matured projects and 
list among the 100 largest MFIs in the region –with a share of 26% of total clients and 34% 
of portfolio within this group as of 2006-, making them highly representative examples. 
Their very success has attracted the attention of a number of scholars –the list of studies the 
following analysis is based on is at the bottom of Table 15, where some major 
characteristics of each program are summarized.
The main lessons to be highlighted are:
a. No particular organizational structure seems to prevail. The literature distinguishes  
alternative organizational designs for MFIs, and the associated pros and cons in terms of 
cost minimization, funding, branding, flexibility and other considerations (see Westley 
(2006)). 
To start, no regularity at all appears from reviewing these 10 cases in terms of an optimal 
regulatory model. There are upgrades (former NGOs later converted to formal financial 
institutions) –Compartamos, BancoSol, Banco Los Andes, FIE, Banco Caja Social y 
Mibanco-, and also downscales (commercial banks that decided to enter the microfinance 
business) –BancoEstado, Bandesarrollo, Crediamigo y Credife-. Likewise, within the 
second group, there are subsidiaries (Bandesarrollo), internal units within the bank 
(Crediamigo), and service companies (BancoEstado and Credife). Finally, the owning bank 
is in some cases private (in Bandesarrollo and Credife) and public in others (BancoEstado 
and Crediamigo). A noticeable trend, though, is that the entry of banks into the market 
dates to a few years back, mostly since the 1990s, while NGOs are generally older and 
enter the formal banking system also in recent years. This reflects (i) the discovery by 
formal intermediaries of this profitable and beforehand neglected niche, and (ii) the NGOs 
self-awareness of financial constraints preventing them from continued growth and the 
need to tap the banking and capital markets. In this sense, the regulatory status seems to be 
dictated by funding rather than reputational or efficiency motives;
b. Capital structure  also varies across successful MFIs. The way any company finances its 
assets may in principle affect not only its average cost of capital but also its incentives for 
cost and revenue optimization. As shown in Table 15, the deposit to loan ratio moves 
within a wide range (from 22.1% for Bandesarrollo to 119.1% for Banco Caja Social).10
For a longer time series, we would certainly find much variation, especially for those MFIs 
that began as NGOs and then transformed themselves into banks.  As Fernando (2004) and 
Jansson (2003) show, ownership structure is also different across LAC MFIs: while in most 
cases a large chunk of capital was retained by the founder NGO, in some of them 
international donors, specialized funds and individual investors have acquired important 
stakes. Nevertheless, despite the often believed differences in disciplining power and 
business profiles associated to different shareholder compositions, there is no clear 
indication in the data of significantly distinct performance or strategies among the 10 cases. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that soft funding was crucial to jump start the projects until 
they gained some financial sustainability;
c. Appropriate staffing. Reviewers of these successful microfinance stories find a common 
concern about the quality of human resources. They all underscore the presence of a 
dedicated, knowledgeable and experienced top management, supported by a well-trained 
and efficient administrative and executive staff. The ability of loan officers, endowed with 
adequate incentive contracts, to screen out bad borrowers and to take actions to secure 
                                                
10 Portocarrero Maisch, Tarazona Soria and Westley (2006) thoroughly study MFI financing patterns for a 
sample of 61 LAC regulated institutions, showing among other findings that deposits have become their main 
source of funding. 
repayment is frequently emphasized as a key factor. Despite this considerable labor 
intensity, more and more accent is put in the competitive edge given by the use of computer 
tools for setting up initial filters, credit scoring systems, repayment scheduling, and 
standarization of administrative procedures;
d. Closeness and responsiveness to demand needs. With slight variations, all MFIs have 
adopted standard microfinance technologies (collective liability, no physical collateral, 
short repayment periods, and the like) coupled with personal visits to the borrower and 
periodical meetings with groups of borrowers and village representatives. This sort of 
market research in the field confers them a greater ability to generate tailor-made products 
with high potential demand;
e. Flexibility, learning and pragmatism. In all cases, MFIs display enough flexibility in 
decision-making so as to take corrective measures as needed, by changing contractual 
clauses or adjusting the visits or meetings regime. In this way, pragmatism and learning-by-
doing are also essential explanatory elements of their success. Examples abound of the 
readiness and timeliness whereby some of the MFIs have made radical strategic shifts to 
deal with unanticipated increases in deliquency rates or operating costs, or to slow down a 
rapid but hardly manageable growth process; and
f. Financial self-sufficiency as overarching goal. Although microfinance services have a 
manifest social angle, long-term sustainability was possible because all these MFIs 
prioritized self-sufficiency, charging interest rates high enough to cover their operational 
costs. Their success has challenged the misconception that MFIs should subsidize credit. 
Much to the contrary, insufficient revenues are bound to jeopardize survival and growth. 
Indeed, poverty outreach may likely be heightened by incorporating a large number of poor 
borrowers at market (or somewhat above-market) rates over a long period rather than a 
small pool at artificially benign conditions for a limited time span. In addition, weak 
financial indicators will be a barrier for regulatory upgrading and the opening of 
supplementary sources of funds beyond international donors and other social investors. 
   
After this brief inspection of flourishing microfinance experiences, a little digression is in 
order. In the midst of the enthusiasm around microfinance and the palpable fruition of 
many programs, it is legitimate to wonder why there are still millions of potential 
customers unserved in a number of countries in LAC and other regions. Accumulated 
experience over the last three decades has seemingly rendered the microfinance business a 
replicable model free from prohibitive entry barriers. However, the fact is that microfinance 
will continue to be a specific, labor- and learning-intensive technology difficult to develop 
for outsiders, even for banks with proven experience in traditional intermediation. Also 
crucial is the minimum scale problem for commercial banks to enter the market. 
Another puzzling observation is that the microfinance industry does not seem to have
suffered systemic crises of the kind that formal banking systems go through all around the 
world from time to time. This is all the way more shocking after pondering the much 
stringent regulations banks are subject to, their strict conditions for granting a loan 
(documentation, collateral, etc.), and the fact that systemic shocks –that have repeatedly hit 
the economies in the region- should have a stronger impact on MFIs, which are often 
poorly diversified across sectors and regions.11 This can be explained by two factors: for 
one, the difference can be an spurious artifact of the different press coverage received by 
the formal banking system and the microfinance industry, which in turn is due to their 
relative size and visibility to the general public. Consequently, it could be the case that the 
financial distress or bankruptcy of a commercial bank rapidly becomes a massive news 
while the mortality of dozens of small NGOs goes unnoticed, save for market players. 
Secondly, and probably foremost, MFIs should be more resilient to liquidity problems than 
banks, as their financiers are social investors for the most part, and they are less concerned 
about repayment than commercial ones. 
                                                
11 Also, the banking literature emphasizes the threat of financial crisis for countries undergoing too rapid a 
growth rate of credit, as banks and regulators might lose their capacity to control moral hazard actions. It is 
striking that, being a relatively young industry, microfinance has been expanding at a very fast pace without 
making it at first glance more vulnerable. To see the contrast between banks and MFIs, it is worth noting 
some credit trends: Bebczuk (2003) shows that, on average for 24 financial crises in LAC countries between 
1975-2002, credit was growing at 14.4% annually in the three years preceding the crisis; in turn, unregulated 
(regulated) MFIs grew at an annual 27% (66%) in 1994-2004, based on a sample of 120 institutions surveyed 
by Marulanda and Otero (2005).

Box: The Role of Credit Registries. The Case of Red Financiera Rural (Ecuador)
In light of microenterprise opacity, a promising remedy is the setup of credit registries 
through which MFIs and other regulated intermediaries can exchange both black and 
white information on borrowers. This reciprocity mitigates adverse selection and moral 
hazard behavior without seriously compromising the benefits of close lending
relationships (which rely more on character knowledge than on business information). A 
flourishing literature has developed in recent years, accompanied by the creation of new 
private and public institutions (see Pagano (2001) for theory and a review of experiences 
in LAC countries). Moreover, the presence and quality of credit bureaus is considered a 
key indicators in assessing investment climate and access to credit around the world by 
the World Bank’s project Doing Business (see www.doingbusiness.org). However, these 
institutions are mostly focused on clients from regulated intermediaries, leaving outside 
the clients of unregulated MFIs.
Ecuador is one example along these lines (see Valdivieso (2007)). The credit bureau 
market began in 2002,  but the four existing firms do not cover borrowers from 
unregulated MFIs. Red Financiera Rural (RFR) is an association of small financial 
intermediaries in Ecuador, which promotes microfinance market development and 
provides technical assistance to its members. In June 2005 it launched a pilot project 
(the SERVIR project) to enhance the coverage of MFI clients in rural and marginal urban 
areas (see Vaca (2007)).. In order to encourage MFI participation in the system, RFR 
offers legal and software training, and delivers free report services about shared clients 
(and about other clients, but only during the first six months). Starting with just 2 MFIs 
in 2005, 113 MFIs are sharing information on 159,000 clients as of 2007. During the 15 
initial months, 44,000 queries were made by 171 institutions. A further planned step is 
to incorporate white information about borrower profiles (education, household 
composition, age, and the like) and building a full scoring model.
Section 3: Banking the Unbanked in Latin America and the Caribbean
This section gauges the access to financial services different from credit, with special 
emphasis on the use of banking accounts. Besides cataloging the barriers for a wider 
financial inclusion, we will discuss two areas of government action (development banks 
and conditional cash transfers), with the final part taking stock of several public and private 
programs that are exhibiting an incipient progress in fostering a more active participation of 
the poor in financial markets.
3.1 Benefits of and Barriers to Financial Inclusion
Although the paper has been so far concerned about credit for productive uses, it is evident 
that a better access to other financial services such as means of payment and saving 
deposits can make a positive contribution to the welfare as well as the disposable income of 
poor households. Some of the expected benefits are: 
(1) the ability to make payments using debit cards, which often carry a discount over other 
means of payment; 
(2) the security that being paid and storing the money in a bank offers compared to being 
paid in cash and keeping the money at home; 
(3) the money saved from avoiding the cash conversion of checks, particularly in remote or 
marginal communities;12
(4) the ability to smooth consumption by safely saving in good times and borrowing (via 
overdrafts, for instance) in bad times, even in small amounts and for short periods; 
(5) the inflationary tax avoided and the real interest revenue from time deposits, which are 
especially valuable during episodes of macroeconomic instability; 
(6) the time saved and the more efficient liquidity management from using bank deposits 
and electronic means of payments;13
                                                
12 Caskey, Durán, and Solo (2006) claim that the cost of making and receiving payments, plus getting credit, 
outside the formal banking system represents between 5% and 15% of the median household income in 
Mexico.
13 In the case of cash transfer programs, payment through a bank account prevents long lines in the paying 
banks and reduces the probability of being robbed after cashing the benefit.
(7) the likely increase in the saving rate, as long as bank deposits may be a partial remedy 
for the lack of self-control and the urge to spend cash holdings;14 and
(8) the increased probability of becoming eligible for a loan from a formal bank once the 
applicant has a deposit account.
Against the background of these private and social gains, actual data reveals a scarce use of 
financial instruments by poor households, as documented at the start of the paper (see also 
IDB (2008)). Demand and supply factors explain this situation. On the supply side, high 
fees and minimum balances –explained by large fixed intermediation costs as well as 
potential non-competitive behavior by banks- appear as major barriers for financial 
inclusion. Economies of scale also justify why banks are unwilling to expand their branch 
and agency network into distant, scarcely populated and poor areas. Likewise, stringent 
eligibility criteria are imposed on new customers, including identification, address, and job 
formal proofs, a set of conditions unlikely to be met by poor and informal workers.15  
On the demand side, potential users of banking services usually express lack of trust in 
financial institutions and straight disinterest in establishing ties with banks. Distrust and 
disinterest, in turn, respond to some underlying factors, such as:
(i) the recurrent nature of costly financial crises in developing countries, which has created 
some social resentment towards the financial sector in every social layer, not only among 
the poor; 
(ii) financial illiteracy, which deprives people from a clear understanding of benefits, costs, 
and risks; 16
(iii) the belief of some people that financial providers will not serve them or will turn them 
down, which might be based either on experience or mere prejudice;
                                                
14 Huffman and Barenstein (2004) document that bank card holders attain a smoother monthly consumption 
than cash-only users in the UK. 
15 Whether these requirements are unilaterally set by the commercial banks or obey regulatory norms in 
different countries remains an open research question. In many cases, recent anti-laundering norms have 
stiffened legal requirements to open accounts.
16 A remarkable example of what can be done in this direction is Promoción y Desarrollo de las 
Microfinanzas (PRODEM), a private sector Bolivian MFI which has extended its ATM network to rural and 
marginal areas, reaching out poor and uneducated customers by introducing user friendly technology –
including color coded touch screen instructions, fingerprint identification, and voice activation in three 
languages (Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara).  
(iv) low and volatile income, which translates into a limited and uncertain amount of 
financial saving capacity; and 
(v) the payment practices in informal labor markets, which operate mostly on a cash basis.
Over and beyond this list of usual suspects, we would like to stress three elements that are 
not given enough priority in the policy agenda:
(1) Macro-level factors have a dominant influence on bankarization. International figures 
show that the percentage of unbanked urban households strongly covaries with economic 
development: while in the US and the UK, this proportion is 9% and 5%, respectively, in 
Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, it climbs to 61%, 57%, and 76%, respectively (see Caskey 
(2006) and UK Treasury (2007)); 
(2) Income-related reasons stand out as the main reason for not having a bank account. 17
Porteus (2005) classifies these reasons into three categories: Income-related issues 
(insufficient or fluctuating incomes), access-related issues (documentation requirements, 
minimum balance, transaction costs), and personal choice issues (no perceived need, trust). 
We follow the same approach in Table 16 for urban surveys in Mexico and Brazil (see 
Caskey (2006) for the original survey format):
Table 16
Motives for Not Having a Bank Account
In % of total urban survey responses
Reasons South 
Africa
Mexico Brazil
Income-related 78 49 71
Access-related 13 29 20
Personal Choice 9 20 4
Other 3 2 5
Sources: Own elaboration based on Porteus (2005) 
and Caskey (2006).
                                                
17 Income insufficiency and poverty are in the end a macro-level problem as well, correlated with the level of 
economic development.
Supply-side (grouped in the access-related item) and preference explanations are 
consistently overshadowed by income considerations.18,19 Another piece of evidence in this 
direction is the proportion of unbanked in the lowest and highest income decile: for Brazil 
and Colombia, 68% and 81% among the poorest are unbanked, but only 8% and 24% 
among the richest (see Kumar (2005) and Solo and Manroth (2006)); and 
(3) The access constraint problem is not as pervasive as it may seem. First, affordable and 
readily available bank accounts exist in large number (relative to standard accounts) in 
many countries. Indeed, Peachey and Roe (2006) report results from a worldwide, 
painstaking survey of accounts opened at alternative or double-bottom line institutions 
(including savings banks, postal banks, development banks, credit unions, cooperatives, 
and MFIs). CGAP (2004b) labels them as accessible accounts, under the reasonable 
assumption that these institutions have a social outreach objective, are not-for-profit and 
target poor strata of the population, so it is most likely that they seek to minimize the cost 
of financial access (even though there is no direct data on costs or the clientele income 
profile). A total 1.4 billion of such accounts were identified for about 120 countries. For 
Latin America, information on the number of accounts per adult is presented in Table 17:
                                                
18 The latter might in practice be even more important than these surveys reveal, as the inability to maintain a 
minimum balance requirements does in fact reflect insufficient income. On the other hand, the income 
insufficiency survey response may be partly associated to disinterest or unawareness of financial 
opportunities. For example, the failure to open an account to improve money management over the wage 
cycle, even without any saving purpose, cannot be entirely blamed on low income. 
19 This discussion parallels that regarding access to credit. Navajas and Tejerina (2006) assert that many 
entrepreneur do not even apply for a loan because they anticipated that they will be rejected. They even find
confirmatory evidence from several household survey in LAC countries for the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
However, in a similar exercise for Guatemala and Nicaragua with 2006 data, Bebczuk (2008) runs some
statistical and econometric tests and encounters that these individuals have a socioeconomic profile akin to 
other individuals who admit that they did not apply because they were unable to repay. Ultimately, settling the 
issue of why individuals self-excludes from the financial system requires a deeper knowledge that goes 
beyond a simple survey response, as Navajas and Tejerina (2006) acknowledge as well.
Table 17
Number of Accessible Bank Accounts per Adult in LAC Countries
Number of accessible 
accounts per adult
Countries
0.01 – 0.1 Venezuela, El Salvador, Guyana, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica
0.1 – 0.2 Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras, 
Paraguay
0.2 – 0.5 Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico, Peru
0.5 – 1 Bolivia, Cuba, Chile, Uruguay
Source: Peachey and Roe (2006).
These figures are not particularly low relative to the total number of deposit accounts in the 
regulated banking system (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2007)). For 
example, in Brazil, there exists one accessible account for each regular account –in 
Argentina and Mexico, the proportions is 0.6 and 0.5. 
Second, Beck et al (op. cit.) survey a small but representative set of commercial banks in 54 
countries, and show that the sample median of the minimum amount to open a saving 
account is 1.21% of per capita GDP and that of annual fees is 0.01%. These again do not 
strike as particularly prohibitive even for low-income households.
To close this subsection, it is interesting to note that the costs of being unbanked affect also 
the poor in advanced economies. Family Welfare Association (2007) reports that in the UK 
households on low incomes pay more than others for basic necessities due to their lack of 
credit of any sort. For example, they are forced to buy their durable goods from sub-prime 
credit shops that charge annual interest rates of 70%-200%. Similarly, poor households 
without a banking account in need of cash checking or overdraft services must pay high 
charges in resorting to pawnbrokers, buy-back stores or informal lenders. The document 
includes a back-of-the-envelope calculation showing that the lack of financial services 
creates an annual cost of £1,000, about 9% of disposable income for the average poor 
household, compared to other households –what the study refers to as the “poverty 
premium”. In turn, UK Treasury (2007) claims that non-mainstream legal and illegal credit 
sources serve at least 3 million poor customers. For the US, Caskey, Durán, and Solo 
(2006) estimate that annual payment services amount to 2.5%-4% of the median household 
income for an unbanked family. In dollar terms, their ballpark amount spent on payment 
services is $100 for a banked family and $600 for an unbanked one.
3.2 State Programs
Development Banks and Other Government-led Programs
Banking theory asserts that, since private banks may refuse to serve poor clients, state-
owned banks and related government-sponsored financial programs are able to undo this 
market failure. The usual caveat is that public sector institutions suffer from severe agency 
problems themselves, as they are subject to distorting political interference, have managers 
Box: Saving Arrangements for the Poor
It is usually believed that the poor only save in real assets, such as housing, jewelry, 
livestock, seeds, and so on, although available experience and theory prove this 
presumption to be inaccurate. For instance, CGAP (2005), in assessing saving practices 
in Mexico, finds that, compared to high income earners, the low income ones save less 
in formal banks (11% against 67% of total households in each group), but more in 
physical assets such as grain, animals and construction materials (47% against 17%).
That the poor build financial savings under a propitious environment is demonstrated by, 
for example, the case of the Thrift and Credit Groups in India. Schrader, Jyothi, and 
Prakash (2005) depict the structure of these programs. Closed groups of about 15 
women collect savings and grant loans under self-determined rules. Loans are used to 
cover a variety of needs, ranging from emergency expenses to housing, education and 
entrepreneurial activities. Each group elects its own authorities, holds monthly meetings, 
ranks loan applications, and receives technical assistance. Annual interest rates were set, 
in this case study, at 12% for deposits and 24% for loans. Group leaders form a 
federation, and in some cases the federation opens a joint bank account. The same model 
is followed by the Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) spread all over 
the world. RoSCAs exist not only in Africa and Asia, but also in Latin America, where 
they receive different names according to the country: pasanakus in Bolivia, juntas or 
panderos in Peru, consorcios in Brazil, cadenas in Colombia, tandas in Mexico, sanes in 
Dominican Republic, cuchuberos in El Salvador, and partners in Jamaica (see Cermeno 
and Schreiner (1998)). In evaluating the impact these schemes have on saving decisions, 
Gugerty (2003) encounters, using a dataset of 70 RoSCAs and about 1,100 members in 
Africa, that the main reason to join these organizations is the commitment technology to 
save, as they help resolve self-discipline and intrahousehold conflicts. At a more 
conceptual level, Gomez-Soto and Gonzalez-Vega (2007) construct and simulate a 
model proving that the move from real to financial savings by rural households is 
heavily influenced by the transaction costs of keeping money with a financial 
intermediary.
appointed based on political connections rather than on professional skills, lack 
performance-linked remuneration structures, and enjoy some degree of regulatory 
forbearance. These conditions incubate socially harming actions, such as corruption, state 
capture, and soft-budget constraints. In the absence of the right incentives, proper 
accountability, transparency and checks and balances, these institutions are unlikely to 
perform as expected in terms of solving the deficient access to credit of some economic 
units. 
In the case of LAC, a handful of recent papers examine development banking in some 
countries, namely: Marulanda and Paredes (2005) for Colombia, Castillo Torres (2005) for 
Peru, Pulgar Parada (2006) for Chile, Bebczuk (2007) for Argentina, and Anaya Mora 
(2007) for Mexico. A common thread to these reviews is a conspicuous lack of:
(i) disclosure and transparency towards the public and oversight bodies regarding detailed 
credit allocation and impact evaluation; 
(ii) reliable and consistent methodologies to target promising sectors and borrowers, and 
doubtful role as market failure solvers;20
(iii) effective enforcement devices to eradicate the perception of loans as implicit 
subsidies;21
(iv) mechanisms to promote a permanent relationship of beneficiaries with the commercial 
banking system without depending on state assistance; 
(v) coordination of multiple and overlapping national and subnational programs;22 and 
(vi) dissemination plans to create awareness and involvement of potential users, and 
avoiding discretional and inefficient fund allocation.
                                                
20 Bebczuk (2007) argues in the Argentine case that public banks do not differ from private banks with respect 
to their strong concentration on large borrowers and in highly populated, urban areas. Marulanda and Paredes 
(2005) assert that development banks in LAC have been more successful acting as second- rather than first-
floor banks.
21 PNUD (2005) investigates some MFIs in Argentina and finds that private ones have a non-performing 
portfolio of 2.1%, against 25% in the case of the microcredit program of the public sector-owned Banco 
Nación. 
22 As an example, Marulanda and Paredes (2005) show that there 104 development banks in 21 LAC 
countries, that is, an average of 5 banks per country. 
Table 16 enumerates some major state programs directed to financially support 
microentrepreneurs by granting credit in a first-floor fashion, channeling funds at low cost 
to other commercial banks fulfilling a second-floor service, subsidizing MFIs, and offering 
guarantees for MFI borrowing. Two salient features are worth mentioning: first, committed 
funds are still quite low vis-à-vis other credit sources; and, second, information is 
notoriously scarce in all cases.
From this brief overview a striking stylized fact emerges: in the face of a flagrant market 
failure in the credit access for the poor, the natural candidate to deal with this distortion (the 
state) seems to be doing a poorer job and displaying worse disclosure and governance 
standards than the commercially-oriented private sector.
Conditional Cash Transfers 
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) are aimed at reducing current poverty while fighting 
future poverty by conditioning the transfer on compliance with some human capital-related 
requirements such as schooling, health and nutrition. Programs in this line in LAC 
countries include, among others: Bolsa Familia (Brazil), Familias en Acción (Colombia), 
Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua), Oportunidades (Mexico), Red Solidaria (El 
Salvador), Superémonos (Costa Rica), Tekopora (Paraguay), Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
(Argentina), and Chile Solidario (Chile). Kakwani, Soares and Son (2005), Soares, Ribas 
and Guerreiro Osorio (2007), Standing (2007), Soares and Britto (2007), and Lindert, 
Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) describe and analyze the impact of some of this programs, 
concluding that they generally have had positive effects on the targeted human capital 
investments. 
Given the ample coverage of these programs, it appears that financial components could be 
included in the benefit package so as to encourage more participation in the financial 
markets. In several cases, payment is still made in cash at designated banks, and plan 
designers do not seem to have cared much about possible financial inclusion mechanisms 
attached to the transfer. This certainly is a missed opportunity to familiarize beneficiaries 
with the use of transaction and saving accounts and, afterwards, with credit facilities.
Nevertheless, on a more optimistic note, the achievements of some particular programs 
seems to be creating a positive spillover effect across the region, and most welcome 
developments are foreseen in coming years.23
3.3 Case Studies
Some case studies forcefully demonstrate the potential gains that could be reaped in terms 
of financial inclusion. Exemplary cases include the following:
Argentina: Plan Jefes y Jefas
The Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar started in 2002 and provides a monthly subsidy of 
AR$150 (about US$47) to 1,500,000 households heads as long as they are unemployed and
have at least one child under 18. The payment switched from cash to electronic baking 
payment in gradual stages during 2004-2005, with the opening of a free deposit account at 
Banco Nación, the largest public bank in the country, and the provision of a debit card to 
withdraw money from ATMs and make payments at stores. Duryea and Schargrodsky 
(2007) conducted a thorough econometric research on the effects of the reform through 
end-2006, exploiting three databases (a satisfaction survey, the national household survey, 
and one on consumer expenditures). They reach the following results:
a. About 90% of the respondents expressed that the new system was better than the 
previous one, with an equally overwhelming majority stating that the reason for that was 
the avoidance of long waiting lines at cashiers´ windows;
                                                
23 The use of deposit accounts provides free information on cash flows and the very savings stock can serve as 
collateral, easing loan appraisal and monitoring. Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006) present some cases in 
Bangladesh and Malawi where participation in social safety nets allow some beneficiaries with good plan 
record to access financial services from MFIs.
b. In relation to time savings, the average time spent to cash the benefit went down from 
251 from 43 minutes, and the percentage of people able to walk to the bank instead of 
taking a bus increased from 32% to 49% due to the higher penetration of ATMs;
c. The new platform did not increase the likelihood that the families will be able to stretch 
the subsidy until the end of the month. This suggests either that the change had no bearing 
on consumption smoothing behavior or plainly that the grant is too small relative to basic 
needs so that it cannot materially affect consumption planning;
d. No change in the level of bankarization (measured by the opening of additional deposit 
accounts beyond the one attached to the benefit) was found. This again can be a 
consequence of lack of interest in participating in the formal banking system, the low 
income level, or a delayed adjustment to new financial practices;
e. The percentage of people declaring to share part of the benefit with the organization or 
person that sponsored his or her affiliation to the program fell from 4% to 0.3% (allegedly 
explained by the higher transparency and more difficult access to the money by the 
community´s political bosses); and 
f. The possession of a debit card significantly increased the share of purchases made at 
supermarkets and wholesalers, motivated by the VAT rebate (15% of the price) in place in 
Argentina when using electronic means of payment.
Mexico: Proyecto Regional de Asistencia Técnica al Microfinanciamiento Rural
(PATMIR)
PATMIR is a technical assistance project led by the Mexican government with World Bank 
funding, initiated in 2003 with the purpose of promoting a better access to financial 
services in marginalized rural areas. It involves the creation of new intermediaries and the 
strengthening of the existing ones. To date, 34 institutions (13 newly created ones) have 
participated in PATMIR and clientele is estimated in 200,000 individuals. Three highly 
specialized international consulting firms were commissioned to provide technical 
assistance under their own preferred methodologies. In three and a half years, PATMIR-
supported institutions have reached a loan portfolio of US$34 million and a similar amount 
of deposits. The experience so far confirms that rural finance can be a viable business in the 
medium term, and that new intermediaries can reach financial self-sufficiency in 2-5 years. 
A 5-year panel survey on 5,800 households for 2004-2008 is under way, but partial results 
are still being processed and analyzed. Descriptions of the program can be found in Paxton 
(2007), Zapata Alvarez (2007), and SAGARPA (2006).
Mexico: La Red de la Gente
L@ Red de la Gente (People´s Network, in English) is an alliance, launched in 2001, 
between BANSEFI (Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros) with a number of 
small non-bank financial institutions (Entidades de Ahorro y Crédito Popular, EACP), 
including cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations, to provide 
financial services to low income clients in urban and rural areas. BANSEFI leads and 
coordinates the network, and provides technical and regulatory assistance. It comprises 167 
EACPs with 1,530 branches in 700 cities and counties (the second financial network in the 
country), with a clientele of around 4 million people. Accounts can be opened at no cost 
with an initial balance of just US$5.
Active workers can also apply for a housing loan subsidized by the Instituto del Fondo 
Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT), a governmental 
organization devoted to the promotion of housing for low income households. Applicants 
must first open a savings account for the equivalent of US$5 and save in it 5%-15% of the 
loan. The accumulated savings are used to cancel the loan at maturity.
La Red has also helped reduce the cost of remittances from the US with Directo a Mexico, a 
program between BANSEFI and the Federal Reserve that facilitate bank-to-bank 
channeling of remittances. Once a bank account is opened in the US, the program allows 
the migrant to open another account at BANSEFI with no commissions and a minimum 
required balance of US$5. The wiring cost is low and money can be withdrawn the next 
day. About 1.4 million remittances for US$500 million dollars are made per year, as of 
mid-2007, through this program. 
Mexico: The Oportunidades Program
Created in 1997 (under the name of Progresa until 2001), the Oportunidades program 
consists of a cash transfer to households in extreme poverty under well-defined education 
and health conditions to be met by the beneficiaries (98% of which are women). About 5 
million households receive this benefit that amounts to a minimum of US$16 a month per 
household for food plus additional amounts for health and other items. In particular, 
households are eligible for higher payments depending on the educational attainment of 
their young members: for instance, if the child is assisting to third grade (primary school), 
the household receives US$11, but gets US$69 when the child reaches twelfth grade (senior 
high school).  
About 1.3 million households are paid through a free-of-charge bank account at BANSEFI 
(and a minor fraction through the private bank BBVA Bancomer). Anecdotal evidence 
shows that, first, after a few months recipients begin to put aside some of the benefit in 
their accounts; and second, beneficiaries find it easier to get microloans, due to their stable 
income flow and the good signal of fulfilling the strict requirements to be entitled to the
transfer.
Jóvenes con Oportunidades is a component put forward in 2003 to encourage higher 
schooling levels. Students from a beneficiary household who finish senior high school 
before they turn 22 years old are granted a savings account of US$300 that can be used to 
pay for tuition in a superior education institution, housing improvement, health insurance, 
or put as collateral for a microloan from an EACP member of the Red de la Gente. During 
the 2003-2006 period, 289,000 students became eligible, and 74% chose to formalize the 
bank account.
All in all, the Oportunidades program seems to have had a positive impact on saving and 
investment decisions. A thorough study by Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina (2007) 
contends that beneficiary households save 14 cents out of 1 peso transfer, and that they 
invest them in productive activities with a rate of return of about 15%, boosting 
consumption by 48% after 5 years in the program.
Brazil: Caixa Econômica Federal
Caixa Econômica Federal, a government-owned bank, has dramatically extended outreach 
by setting up the Caixa Aqui account, accesible through debit card and numerous point-of-
sale terminals at correspondents such as the State Lottery, which have added 12,000 new 
access points to the bank’s main network of 2,200 offices. These Unidades Lotericas are 
spread even in remote areas and are licensed to pay social benefits, accept deposits and 
withdrawals via cashier or ATM (for small amounts of up to US$ 500), and receive card 
and account opening applications. Three million accounts (10% of all Caixa accounts) have 
been opened until 2006. The account opening includes a pre-agreement to provide credit, 
and after ninety days of account use –provided documentation is in order- the bank 
automatically sends the customer a contract to sign if they want to take an initial credit of 
up to US$ 70 for a period of four months at an interest cost of 2% per month. After this 
period, scoring of the client’s actual credit performance and continued account usage
allows access to larger amounts for longer periods (up to a year). 
These achievements build on to a great extent on innovative government policies initiated 
in the late 1990s. The Caixa Aqui account is the result of the simplified bank account 
regime introduced in 2003 by the Central Bank for clients with small balances of up to 
1,000 reales (see Curat, Lupano and Gineste (2007)). These accounts have no cost and can 
be easily opened upon presentation of an ID. Transfers to beneficiaries of social plans are 
deposited into these accounts on an electronic card called Carta Cidadao (Citizen Card). 
The number of accounts has climbed from 2 millions in 2004 to 7 million in 2007. In turn, 
the authorization to hire non-bank correspondents was passed in 1999. Any commercial 
establishment may be licensed as correspondent, but the ultimate legal responsibility lies 
with the financial institution. As of end-2005, there were 90,400 correspondents covering 
all the Brazilian territory, compared to 57,700 regular agencies (of which 17,600 were bank 
branches). Moreover, in 2007 the government has expressed the intention of launching a 
microcredit program for the 11 million beneficiary households from Bolsa Familia. 
However, the project is still in the working until the many operational obstacles will be 
solved.
In parallel, Caixa launched an electronic account for Brazilians working abroad who want 
to send remittances home direct from a host-country credit card. The account is available in 
50 countries and the transfer cost is just 2% compared to the 8-15% typical of more 
traditional channels. These remittances can feed Aqui accounts of relatives, and a second 
stage of the international e-banking project will allow migrant workers in the US to access 
their Caixa Aqui accounts directly through terminals of banks that have celebrated 
agreements with Caixa. 
Ecuador: La Chauchera
Banco Solidario, an Ecuadorian bank specialized in microfinance, issued in 1999 La 
Chauchera (purse in local Spanish), a smart card for microentrepreneurs to buy raw 
materials at wholesale prices directly from big suppliers. Banco Solidario opens a credit 
line with a pre-determined limit and the seller is paid immediately. ATM and other debit 
transactions can also be performed with the card, which is used by more than 20,000 small 
producers (see Prior Sanz (2007)).. Information on input purchases and other financial 
transactions can in time feed credit scoring cards of these clients, facilitating their access to 
additional credit and other banking services. La Chauchera is also provided to people that 
receives remittances from abroad. Ecuadorian migrants, especially those living in Spain, 
can send money home through some Spanish savings banks (Cajas de Ahorro) in 
agreement with Banco Solidario under its program “Mi familia, mi país, mi regreso” (“My 
family, my country, my homecoming”). Besides the reduced commission (about 4% of the 
transfer, compared to 20% with some other non-bank channels), money can be withdrawn 
in Ecuador from the extended branch and ATM network of Banco Solidario, but the sender 
keeps control over consumption and saving decisions. Remittances for over US$ 100 
million are intermediated by this bank-to-bank program.
Colombia: La Banca de las Oportunidades
La Banca de las Oportunidades is an official program launched in August 2006 that began 
its operation in January 2007 under the oversight of an inter-ministerial committee. Rather 
than a first- or second-floor bank, the scheme seeks to support and coordinate efforts to 
increase the access to financial services to low income households. Its plan encompasses 
regulatory changes as well as cost subsidies, project cofinancing, and technical assistance to 
private banks and non-bank providers. It is endowed with an annual budget of about US$63 
million. For the time being, a major achievement has been the authorization to financial 
intermediaries to appoint non-bank correspondents all over the Colombian territory, 
inspired by the Brazilian model. As of November 2007, 3,436 correspondents have been 
licensed in 346 towns, contributing to a much broader geographic scope of financial 
services. La Banca de las Oportunidades has also set ambitious targets for 2010 in terms of 
microcredits granted, including a stock of 5 million loans, with 1.5 million conferred to 
newcomers in the financial sector. However, the concrete tools and action plans to fulfill 
this objective have yet to be specified.
Argentina: Cuentas Sueldo 
While not strictly targeted to poor individuals, this product is a good example of what 
banking policies can add to improve bankarization without incurring expensive state 
programs. Cuentas Sueldo (Wage Accounts) were introduced in Argentina in August 2001 
by Presidential Decree and mandated that all employers had to deposit salaries in these 
accounts under the name of the employee. Beyond the original goal of increasing labor 
formality and the volume of deposits in the midst of the financial crisis, the decision had a 
decisive impact on the number of banked households. The accounts are free of charge –
including 4 monthly withdrawals and a debit card to be used in ATMs and stores- for wage 
money, and the holder can also feed the account with additional deposits from other income 
sources. As of 2007, more than 6 million accounts have been opened, many of them from 
depositors previously outside the system. An estimated US$34 billion are deposited every 
year in these accounts. According to newspaper information, about 70% of the current total 
stock of personal loans (the most dynamic loan type in the post-crisis period) was granted 
to Cuenta Sueldo holders. Banks report the direct knowledge of the client’s cash flow and 
the ability to automatically debit installments from the very account as key factors in their 
preference for these borrowers. Intense competition exists in the market to attract these 
clients, and loans are agreed on average for more than 48 months and annual interest rates 
below 20% -these are very favorable conditions for the Argentine personal credit market. It 
is worth noting that this is an entirely commercial product, with no subsidy component of 
any kind from the government (although public banks also are major players in the market).
Mzansi Account in South Africa
Created in August 2004 under a joint initiative of the 4 major South African banks –yet 
with an initial push by the government, which encouraged banks to take some social 
responsibility steps-, the Mzansi Account has no management fees and allows one monthly 
free deposit. The only requirement to open it is to have a valid ID and proof of address. The 
account owner is entitled to a debit card usable at any ATM (with the same cost no matter 
the ATM network) and postal offices. By August 2006, just two years after its inception, 
3.3 million accounts were opened, 90% of them by people that had never previously had 
one.24 Another healthy outcome of the reform has been its commercial viability, as revealed 
by the fierce competition between banks (including the emergence of a similar product 
issued by other financial institutions), their expensive marketing campaigns, and the 
broadened menu of financial products offered to the account holders.
                                                
24 Despite this remarkable success, this figure still represents 25.3% of the unbanked at the time of launching 
the product, which reflects the presence of other non-access-related difficulties in the process of financial 
inclusion, as discussed earlier.
Conclusions and Main Lessons
The study has sought to characterize the current status of financial inclusion in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, distinguishing the involvement of the public and the private 
sector and identifying the obstacles for a wider outreach. Given the broad scope of the 
paper, the effort was aimed at reviewing the profuse but dispersed literature and data with a 
critical eye. Emphasis has been placed into challenging conventional wisdom on the basis 
of the available research and case studies. The main lessons from the analysis are the 
following:
1. Low financial penetration is undoubtedly a worrying issue in poverty reduction policies 
in Latin America.
2. All interested parties should form realistic expectations about the potential contribution 
of microfinance. The benefits seem to have been over-advertised, especially in the 
media, by highlighting individual success stories and failing to recount less fortunate 
cases of MFIs and borrowers’ defaults. Hard evidence, in contrast, has so far reached 
mixed results regarding impact evaluation and extreme poverty outreach, although they 
are not categorical due to some data and statistical limitations. The main risk from 
taking the positive view at face value is that it might give rise to overconfidence by 
donors and lenders, thus debilitating the needed degree of oversight, monitoring and 
discipline in running the business. Also, as in the banking system, rapid, unmanageable 
credit booms might turn out to be self-defeating.
3. One misleading omission in such popular cover stories is that the observed low ratio of 
overdue loans hinges on the extraordinary ability of MFIs to select and monitor their 
clients, rather than on a natural inclination of borrowers to perform. Actually, the lack 
of business and financial skills, coupled with unmet basic consumption needs and the 
possible confusion of credit with a subsidy, might translate into overborrowing and 
unwillingness to repay. Ingenious and unconventional incentive devices, plus the 
increasing application of technological resources, are central ingredients in the formula 
for successful microfinance.
4. The specificity of the microlending technology makes it optimal for MFIs to have a 
leading role in the provision of small scale loans. Among other differences, commercial 
banks are unlikely to establish the kind of close relationship with the borrower inherent 
in a typical microcredit operation. Of course, the downscaling of commercial banks can 
and actually has worked in numerous cases, but only when the institution has 
committed enough resources and adopted the required philosophy to serve these new 
clients within a functionally separated unit. In sum, not every bank, and not even every 
MFI, can safely embark into microfinance.
5. By the same token, public banks should preferably refrain from acting as first floor 
microlenders. As a rule, the operational structure of public banks in the region is similar 
to that of other commercial banks. Compounding the problem, public banks display 
evident inefficiencies in resource allocation. Moreover, some evidence shows that 
public bank clients, including micro borrowers, tend to adopt a moral hazard behavior 
by refusing to repay the loans. This stems from a decades-long history of subsidies and 
defaulted but unprosecuted borrowers.
6. Recent experiences in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia hint that governments can play a 
decisive role in coordinating financial inclusion initiatives, leading normative changes, 
and supporting innovative banking outreach strategies without engaging directly in 
credit allocation. Equally important, yet obvious, is the preservation of an adequate 
climate of political commitment and accountability. 
7. In the spirit of risk-based regulation, MFIs should be subject to a more lax regime than 
commercial banks since, in light of the small industry size, modest deposit-taking 
activity and solid historical performance, they do not appear as a significant source of 
systemic risk. According to observed market trends, the number of regulated MFIs has 
increased on a voluntary basis: growing MFIs, under donor pressure or seeking deposit 
financing, have chosen to be under the regulatory umbrella, especially for reputational 
purposes. In any case, the sharp differences between the business of typical MFI vis-à-
vis a commercial bank make it convenient to adopt a distinct regulatory model run by a 
specialized department. In the meantime, the consumer protection duties should be 
considerably strengthened sooner than later, as argued later on.
8. More research is required to quantify the impact of microcredit on economic and social 
outcomes. This research should be a decisive element of judgment for donors, local 
governments, and other stakeholders. Unfortunately, this line of work is still in its 
infancy in LAC countries. A sensible first step forward would be to encourage or 
mandate MFIs to disclose borrower microdata on a regular basis (respecting basic rules 
of confidentiality and commercially sensitive information). As these organizations 
receive different kinds of local or international subsidies, donors and governments have 
the bargaining power to obtain MIFs collaboration towards this objective. Additionally, 
a more coordinated academic effort should be undertaken, preferably supported by a 
multilateral organization, to produce high quality impact evaluations based on a 
comparable methodology and performance measures.
9. An interesting paradox is that microfinance is a matter of social interest that is and 
should be mostly provided by private, commercially-driven parties under commercial 
terms. Furthermore, there is a widespread consensus that MFIs should strive for 
financial self-sufficiency, avoid subsidized credit, and charge market (but not abusive) 
interest rates on loans. 
10. The proactive involvement of international organizations, such as the IDB, World Bank, 
USAID and others is also, based on worldwide experience, an invaluable external 
catalyst for reforms and market development.
11. As in the case of microcredit, a positive lesson from bankarization experiences is that 
they are generally pushed by private sector intermediaries (or commercial public ones 
that compete with them). This implies that well-run projects on financial inclusion are 
profitable. It also indicates that some lowering of entry barriers for the poor into the 
financial system -in the form of cost-free accounts and other services- pays off in the 
short or medium term. 
12. While this evidence casts doubts about the market failure approach to financial 
inclusion, it is equally true that the entry of new private players into the microfinance 
business has been far from massive, and that coverage continues to be quite low (not 
only in absolute terms but also relative to that of commercial banking). Further 
investigation is needed to identify remaining barriers and to assess the optimal size of 
the microfinance industry.
13. An apparent limitation to micro-based official policies is the macroeconomic context 
(low per capita GDP, income inequality, chronic instability). Likewise, the same 
environment actually incubates a low depth and breadth of financial services across all 
population groups, not only the poor. Rather than discouraging creative efforts, this 
observation should contribute to set targeted policies with tailored products and close 
progress oversight. Unfortunately, well-meant programs to reach a massive share of the 
poor are likely to go half-way unless the macro environment is not upgraded.
14. In the same vein, the low level of bankarization seems to be explained to a larger degree 
by lack of demand vis-à-vis supply-side constraints. Low and volatile incomes, plus the 
ignorance or misunderstanding of the net benefits of having a bank account, are pivotal 
motives in the decision to stay out of the financial system.
15. The payment of social benefits, particularly conditional cash transfers, through bank 
accounts at low cost and with minimum formal requirements is a well-suited 
mechanism to bring the poor into the formal financial system, as they combine three 
desirable conditions: (a) They are compulsory, so the decision to open a bank account is 
not up to the beneficiary. Voluntary participation may not work as long as the 
household members do not perceive the need or fail to understand the net benefits of 
using banking facilities; (b) The broad household coverage of these programs in Latin 
America creates a critical mass of new clients that should render this line of business 
attractive enough even for profit-maximizing commercial banks; and (c) Plan 
membership typically extends for a long time (sometimes years), favoring a slow and 
hopefully permanent change in financial and consumption practices brought about by 
the familiarization with banking transactions.
16. In spite of this window of opportunity, progress in the area is limited to a small set of 
countries and, even in these countries, impact evaluations do not have properly examine 
the financial side of the programs. One major cause of this omission is that social 
security authorities generally lack financial background and might be indifferent or 
indisposed towards considering financial inclusion as part of social inclusion. This can 
be dealt with by offering them some training on financial matters and by mandating
some degree of coordination with financial regulators.
17. Regulatory authorities should consider active policies to force employers and banks to 
promote a more intense usage of financial services among the populace at large. Moral 
suasion (on the grounds of social responsibility) and straight normative obligation can 
be resorted to, without this being qualified as a suffocating intervention.25 Much to the 
contrary, as mentioned before, this strategy is bound to open up bank revenue-
enhancing opportunities through cross-selling and intermediation spreads.
18. There is a need to expand the geographic outreach of banking services in order to get 
them closer to potential users in remote or poor locations. For this to happen,
governments should provide incentives to align the private and the social interest of 
commercial banks currently reluctant to open new agencies. Innovative practices, like 
non-financial correspondents and mobile bank offices appear as promising and feasible 
options. As a second step, it would be desirable to spur competition between financial 
providers. Financial and technical support to double bottom-line institutions 
(cooperatives, MFIs, savings banks, credit unions, and the like) will likely serve this 
purpose. 
19. All official endeavours, while not requiring at all direct public provision, do need to be 
complemented by an enforceable consumer protection framework. Poorly informed 
consumers are prone to be victims of fraud and low quality service by profit-driven 
intermediaries. Periodical field surveys among clients, as well as close tracking of bank 
charges and other possible abusive practices, should be the basis for publicized 
sanctions upon malpractice detection. Unfortunately, financial regulation in LAC 
countries tends to disdain this aspect in favor of systemic risk containment (see 
Bebczuk, Demaestri and Pereira Campos (2008)).
20. By the same token, an obvious advice is to reinforce basic financial education among 
the poor, exploiting for example the points of contact with the beneficiaries of social 
programs (payment offices, banks, schools, hospitals, NGOs).26
                                                
25 Two cases in point are the Cuentas Sueldo in Argentina and the Mzasi Account in South Africa, 
summarized in the last section of the paper.
26 A nice example is the Financial Literacy Program put in place by Habitat for Humanity, a NGO that builds 
houses and sells them at construction cost to poor families with credits at 7 to 30 years. About 1,800 
beneficiary households have been receiving since 2005 training on income and expenditure management and 
planning. Citigroup provides financial support for this and other similar programs, like the one led by 
Freedom from Hunger and Microfinance Opportunities in association with the MFI ProMujer in Bolivia, as 
well as in other MFIs in various regions.
21. The impulse to the creation and widened coverage of credit bureaus is another effective 
policy towards a more fluid access to credit by the new bank clients. The use of credit 
scoring, based on both black and white information, reduces costs and facilitates the 
loan process of commercial banks.
22. Financial inclusion policies should follow a long-term and integral approach by 
blending transaction services, saving deposits, credit, remittances, insurance, and 
pensions. Not only will this amplify the impact of financial inclusion policies, but will 
also create economies of scale and scope to the financial intermediaries. In terms of 
sequencing, payment accounts (where wages or social transfers are deposited) are the 
most immediate vehicle to attract poor clients. As far as possible, building a saving 
stock, even a very small one, should precede credit to create positive incentives for
repayment. Ultimately, this follows from the goal of instilling a culture of 
entrepreneurship and lifetime consumption smoothing as tools to combat long-term 
poverty. New saving habits will eventually lead to the demand of more sophisticated 
products.
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Table 1
Percentage of total and poor households receiving credit in selected LAC countries
Table 2
Mean Credit to Household Income (in %)
Country Year
% of total households 
receiving credit
% of poor households 
receiving credit
Bolivia 2002 12.4 7.2
Ecuador 2005 34.5 27.3
Guatemala 2000 11.1 9.1
Haiti 2001 9.0 11.9
Mexico 2002 1.5 1.3
Nicaragua 2001 6.7 12.6
Paraguay 2001 4.3 3.3
Peru 2002 1.3 3.0
Average 10.1 9.5
Source: Bebczuk and Haimovich (2006). Ecuador data from Bebczuk (2007).
Ecuador 2005 23.7 14.4
Guatemala 2000 27.5 19.5
Nicaragua 2001 19.1 12.7
Peru 2002 23.0 34.4
Average 23.3 20.2
Source: Bebczuk and Haimovich (2006). Ecuador data from Bebczuk (2007).
Country Year All Households Poor Households
Table 3
Percentage of Households with Loans or Savings with Formal Institutions
Credit Saving Credit Saving
Bolivia 2000 7.0 9.9 5.3 4.5
Dominican Rep. 2001 10.9 25.1 5.8 9.8
Ecuador 1998 9.8 22.7 4.9 7.9
El Salvador 2002 1.3 - 0.5 -
Guatemala 2000 6.4 16.8 4.2 2.5
Haiti 2001 - 11.7 - 3.7
Jamaica 1997 3.8 59.4 1.0 40.2
Mexico 2002 6.2 20.6 5.3 14.8
Nicaragua 1998 10.4 5.6 5.0 0.9
Panama 2003 17.5 35.2 8.4 9.9
Paraguay 2001 3.4 3.7 1.7 0.7
Peru 2001 3.5 4.5 1.5 0.9
Weighted Average 6.3 18.0 4.5 10.0
Source: Tejerina and Westley (2007).
Country Year
Total Poor Households
Table 4
Percentage of Microenterprises with credit
Argentina 1998 3.7
Bolivia 2000 6.0
Brazil 1999 2.0
Chile 1998 2.5
Colombia 1999 1.7
Costa Rica 1998 1.6
Dom. Rep. 2001 12.3
Ecuador 1998 13.9
El Salvador 2002 1.2
Guatemala 2000 6.9
Honduras 1999 0.7
Jamaica 1997 3.0
Mexico 1998 0.8
Nicaragua 1998 15.6
Panama 2003 11.1
Paraguay 2001 2.1
Peru 2001 3.2
Uruguay 1998 18.3
Venezuela 1999 2.6
Simple Average 5.7
Source: Tejerina y Westley (2006) and Marulanda (2002).
Microenterprises with 
credit (in %)
YearCountry
Table 5
Loan and Deposit Accounts per 1,000 people 
Source: Beck et al. (2005).
Country 
Loan accounts       
per 1,000 people
Deposit accounts 
per 1,000 people  
Argentina  154.2 368.7
Bolivia  9.5 40.6
Brazil  49.6 630.9
Chile  417.7 1044.8
Colombia  n.a. 612.2
Ecuador  77.1 419.5
El Salvador  126.9 456.7
Guatemala  45.8 403.5
Mexico  n.a. 309.6
Nicaragua  95.6 96.1
Panama  297.8 n.a.
Peru  77.9 316.2
Venezuela  93.0 486.7
Means:
LAC 131.4 432.1
Other Developed 321.2 1862.6
Other Developing 93.1 657.0
Table 6
Microcredit Penetration Rates
Argentina 15 38 0.1% n.a.
Barbados 1 0 0.1% n.a.
Bolivia 29 631 6.9% 11.0%
Brazil 23 915 0.5% 2.3%
Chile 13 473 2.9% 17.1%
Colombia 32 1,449 3.2% 5.0%
Costa Rica 25 54 1.2% 5.7%
Dominican R. 16 234 2.6% 6.2%
Ecuador 70 632 4.8% 10.4%
El Salvador 67 318 4.6% 12.4%
Guatemala 33 465 3.7% 6.6%
Guyana 1 4 0.6% 1.6%
Haiti 19 134 1.6% n.a.
Honduras 31 194 2.7% 5.3%
Jamaica 4 13 0.5% 2.6%
Mexico 64 2,615 2.5% 14.4%
Nicaragua 30 514 10.0% 20.8%
Panama 9 16 0.5% 1.4%
Paraguay 7 311 5.3% 24.2%
Peru 79 2,036 7.3% 13.7%
Trinidad and Tobago 1 2 0.1% 0.7%
Uruguay 6 110 3.2% n.a.
Venezuela 9 52 0.2% n.a.
Total LAC 584 11,211 2.8% 9.0%
Other regions
MENA 51 1,813 0.8% 6.4%
S Asia 670 38,926 4.9% 15.6%
SS Africa 517 7,720 1.3% 3.4%
EAP 189 15,426 2.2% 9.2%
EECA 196 1,800 2.0% 6.6%
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Borrowers / 
poor (%)
Country
Number of 
MFIs Borrowers / 
pop. (%)
Number of 
Borrowers (in 
thousands)
Penetration Rates
Table 7
Academic Studies on Microfinance Impact in LAC Countries
Study  Country and Coverage
Hulme and Mosley (1996) Bolivia: BancoSol  
Mosley (2001)
Bolivia: BancoSol, ProMujer, 
PRODEM and SARTAWA
Banegas et al (2002)
Ecuador: Banco Solidario               
Bolivia: Caja Los Andes
Dunn and Arbuckle (2001a, 
2001b)  
Peru: Mibanco  
MkNelly and Dunford 
(1999)
Bolivia: Credit with Education program
Aroca (2004)
Chile: Bandesarrollo and Propesa; 
Brazil: Microcred, Socialcred, CEAPE, 
Bancri and Banco Povo Santo Andre 
Maldonado (2005)
Bolivia: CRECER, SARTAWA and Pro 
Mujer 
Niño-Zarazúa (2007) Mexico: Fincomun, CAME, Promujer 
Bebczuk and Haimovich 
(2006)
Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, and Paraguay: 
National Household Surveys
Table 8
Regulatory Treatment of MFIs in LAC
Country / Intermediary Bank and nonbank NGOs Cooperatives and
financial institutions Credit Unions
Bolivia Bank Regulator Unregulated Bank Regulator
Brazil Bank Regulator Unregulated Cooperatives Regulator
Colombia Bank Regulator County Cooperatives Regulator
Dominican Republic Bank Regulator Unregulated Cooperatives Regulator
Ecuador Bank Regulator Unregulated Cooperatives Regulator
El Salvador Bank Regulator Unregulated Bank Regulator
Honduras Bank Regulator Unregulated Bank Regulator
Jamaica Bank Regulator Unregulated Cooperatives Regulator
Mexico Bank Regulator Unregulated Bank Regulator
Nicaragua Bank Regulator Unregulated Cooperatives Regulator
Peru Bank Regulator Unregulated Bank Regulator
Source: CGAP Microfinance Regulation Database, www.cgap.org/regulation. 
Table 9
MFIs by Regulatory Status in LAC 
2001 2005
Countries 17 23
Total Number of MFI 184 337
Total (in %) 100.0% 100.0%
Regulated 32.6% 29.1%
Downscales 11.4% 9.5%
Upgrades 21.2% 10.7%
Other regulated 0.0% 8.9%
Unregulated 67.4% 70.9%
Total Portfolio (in US$ millions) 4,407 5,442
Total (in %) 100.0% 100.0%
Regulated 75.8% 81.0%
Unregulated 24.2% 19.0%
Source: Navajas and Tejerina (2006).
Table 10
MFI Performance Indicators as of end-2006: LAC and other regions
Region LAC Africa Asia ECA MENA
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Number of MFIs 228 119 194 126 37
Age (average) 12.0 8.5 10.0 7.0 7.0
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$ million) (average) 5.7 2.1 3.4 5.6 4.6
Offices (average) 8 11 15 11 12
Personnel (average) 90 97 140 57 90
OUTREACH INDICATORS  
Number of Active Borrowers 10,661 9,976 16,168 4,690 13,796
Percent of Women Borrowers 62.6 63.5 98.0 46.5 68.9
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (in US$) 678 235 149 1,597 263
Number of Voluntary Depositors 5,128 5,871 691 0 0
Average Deposit Account Balance (in US$) 712 115 115 1,694 n/a
OVERALL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Return on Assets 2.1 -2.4 0.1 1.3 -0.5
Return on Equity 8.5 -6.9 2.5 5.4 -0.6
Financial Expense/ Assets 6.5 5.5 6.4 7.2 5.4
Financial Revenue/ Assets 29.0 22.2 20.9 25.5 22.3
Yield on Gross Portfolio (real) 26.4 21.3 18.9 19.6 21.4
FINANCING STRUCTURE  
Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio 68.7 54.7 73.1 49.1 39.2
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Total Expense/ Assets 26.7 29.0 22.3 25.5 21.8
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 20.4 33.4 16.9 17.2 21.1
Cost per Loan (in US$) 140.0 92.5 38.0 227.0 62.0
Loans per Loan Officer 258.9 239.6 208.4 164.9 245.2
Loan Officers to Total Staff 52.9 53.4 62.3 50.0 62.7
RISK 
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 3.6 5.0 2.1 1.2 1.4
Portfolio at Risk> 90 Days 2.1 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.4
Write-off Ratio 1.8 1.9 0.7 0.5 0.5
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Table 11
MFI Performance Indicators as of end-2006: LAC Subregions
LAC Regions Central Am. South Am. Caribbean LAC
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Number of MFIs 68 151 9 228
Age (average) 13 13 12 12
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$ million) (average) 45.0 133.4 76.7 61.9
Offices (average) 7 9 17 8
Personnel (average) 72 108 188 90
OUTREACH INDICATORS  
Number of Active Borrowers 8,744 14,666 10,164 10,661
Percent of Women Borrowers 69.8 55.1 69.0 62.6
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (in US$) 6,372 10,742 3,848 7,375
Number of Voluntary Depositors 0 0 0 0
Average Deposit Account Balance (in US$) 0 0 0 0
OVERALL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Return on Assets 1.1 2.3 2.4 2.1
Return on Equity 3.0 9.2 15.9 8.4
Financial Expense/ Assets 8.2 5.5 12.7 6.4
Financial Revenue/ Assets 29.4 26.3 40.6 29.1
Yield on Gross Portfolio (real) 24.2 24.3 46.1 26.4
FINANCING STRUCTURE  
Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio 60.4 81.2 68.7 68.7
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Total Expense/ Assets 27.2 22.1 46.0 26.7
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 23.4 17.4 45.3 20.9
Cost per Loan (in US$) 1,199.0 1,591.0 1,833.0 1,530.0
Loans per Loan Officer 229.0 279.0 187.0 259.0
Loan Officers to Total Staff 54.2 54.5 47.1 52.9
RISK 
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 3.4 2.5 4.1 3.0
Portfolio at Risk> 90 Days 1.4 1.4 2.6 1.5
Write-off Ratio 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.8
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Table 12
MFI Performance Indicators as of end-2006: South American Countries 
Bolivia  Colombia  Ecuador  México Paraguay Peru  
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Number of MFIs 18 14 33 30 6 38
Age (average) 14 20 9 9 29 13
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$ million) (average) 18.7 27.7 4.4 35.9 0.0 11.7
Offices (average) 12 14 5 9 24 10
Personnel (average) 178 182 41 71 351 143
OUTREACH INDICATORS  
Number of Active Borrowers 13,366 36,039 4,446 8,471 40,779 20,299
Percent of Women Borrowers 52.7 64.7 54.7 86.0 45.0 53.2
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (in US$) 1,398 783 987 4,049 616 1,039
Number of Voluntary Depositors 0 0 3,224 0 10,309 0
Average Deposit Account Balance (in US$) 0 0 227 0 2,721 0
OVERALL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Return on Assets 2.0 2.0 0.4 4.2 2.7 4.4
Return on Equity 10.5 8.1 2.7 20.2 20.9 17.6
Financial Expense/ Assets 4.4 7.0 4.2 6.5 9.9 6.0
Financial Revenue/ Assets 20.8 26.8 22.7 46.7 32.9 29.6
Yield on Gross Portfolio (real) 17.7 21.3 20.5 58.1 21.7 31.5
FINANCING STRUCTURE  
Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio 75.9 66.7 76.1 49.3 111.4 88.1
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Total Expense/ Assets 18.1 21.4 21.4 45.7 28.8 23.3
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 15.3 14.6 16.6 47.8 19.0 17.5
Cost per Loan (in US$) 177.0 102.0 148.0 1,741.0 130.0 147.0
Loans per Loan Officer 153.0 301.0 338.0 263.0 329.0 268.0
Loan Officers to Total Staff 57.8 54.7 44.9 50.0 43.4 60.6
RISK 
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 1.2 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.7 2.4
Portfolio at Risk> 90 Days 0.8 1.9 1.9 1.4 2.5 1.4
Write-off Ratio 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.4 4.1 2.3
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Table 13
MFI Performance Indicators as of end-2006: Central American Countries 
Costa Rica  El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua  
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Number of MFIs 7 11 15 12 20
Age (average) 18 11 10 14 13
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$ million) (average) 1.4 2.7 2.9 4.8 7.7
Offices (average) 1 4 5 8 10
Personnel (average) 9 57 35 99 101
OUTREACH INDICATORS  
Number of Active Borrowers 896 5,973 8,268 12,294 13,206
Percent of Women Borrowers 39.2 70.9 79.9 76.0 58.9
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (in US$) 766 935 413 394 670
Number of Voluntary Depositors n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Average Deposit Account Balance (in US$) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
OVERALL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Return on Assets -0.3 1.1 -1.8 3.3 2.3
Return on Equity -0.6 3.4 -5.1 9.7 7.1
Financial Expense/ Assets 12.8 4.5 5.6 8.0 10.6
Financial Revenue/ Assets 28.5 22.3 28.6 34.1 33.0
Yield on Gross Portfolio (real) 17.4 26.5 24.1 35.1 20.6
FINANCING STRUCTURE  
Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio 59.4 35.6 51.4 62.2 75.5
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Total Expense/ Assets 24.8 25.1 27.4 32.5 29.7
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 10.4 26.5 23.0 27.7 18.6
Cost per Loan (in US$) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Loans per Loan Officer n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Loan Officers to Total Staff 51.4 58.0 51.4 53.0 54.2
RISK 
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 4.0 2.8 3.3 5.0 3.0
Portfolio at Risk> 90 Days 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.1
Write-off Ratio 1.3 2.2 1.7 1.1 1.5
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Table 14
MFI Performance Indicators as of end-2006: By Type of MFI 
MFI Type Bank  Credit Union  NBFI  NGO  Profit  
Not for 
Profit  
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Number of MFIs 17 27 61 123 64 164
Age (average) 12 10 12 13 10 13
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$ million) (average) 129.8 9.2 23.9 2.9 26.8 4.1
Offices (average) 47 8 14 5 19 6
Personnel (average) 788 52 183 48 234 55
OUTREACH INDICATORS  
Number of Active Borrowers 100,883 5,728 19,602 6,657 32,448 7,936
Percent of Women Borrowers 50.2 51.4 53.7 70.9 54.9 66.2
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (in US$) 1,500 1,509 973 434 1,013 587
Number of Voluntary Depositors 79,992 15,136 0 0 0 0
Average Deposit Account Balance (in US$) 732 487 0 0 0 0
OVERALL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Return on Assets 0.9 0.4 3.4 2.2 2.2 2.1
Return on Equity 7.6 3.5 18.3 5.8 13.1 6.2
Financial Expense/ Assets 7.8 4.6 7.2 6.5 7.7 5.8
Financial Revenue/ Assets 30.3 17.5 29.1 31.3 30.6 28.6
Yield on Gross Portfolio (real) 20.5 14.6 29.2 28.1 27.5 25.3
FINANCING STRUCTURE  
Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio 99.0 89.2 91.4 53.8 94.2 61.5
OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Total Expense/ Assets 29.1 15.9 25.1 31.4 28.1 26.6
Operating Expense/ Loan Portfolio 18.9 12.0 18.6 27.3 19.8 21.7
Cost per Loan (in US$) 207.0 156.0 163.0 104.0 184.0 127.0
Loans per Loan Officer 302.0 279.0 240.0 263.0 240.0 266.0
Loan Officers to Total Staff 58.0 44.4 58.1 52.3 57.7 51.9
RISK 
Portfolio at Risk> 30 Days 2.7 3.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0
Portfolio at Risk> 90 Days 1.0 2.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6
Write-off Ratio 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.7
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange.
Table 15
Major Features of Selected MFIs in LAC
MFI Country Year of 
creation
Clients
(thousands) 
Portfolio
(mill.US$)
ROA 
(in %)
NPL
(in %)
BancoEstado 
Microempresas 
(BEME)
Chile 1995 229 567 0.8 1.8
Bandesarrollo Chile 1994 74 100 1.6 1.2
Compartamos Mexico 1990 652 269 26.2 0.7
Banco 
Solidario 
(BancoSol)
Bolivia 1992 104 163 3.2 0.2
Banco Los 
Andes
Bolivia 1995 85 189 1.5 0.6
CrediAmigo Brazil 1997 236 89 16.6 0.9
Fomento a 
Iniciativas 
Económicas 
(FIE)
Bolivia 1985 71 101 2.3 0.9
Banco Caja 
Social
Colombia 1911 837 1,659 2.1 2.2
Credife Ecuador 1999 76 136 1.1 n.a
Mibanco Peru 1969 276 320 6.2 4.5
Sources: Bicciato et al. (2002), Campion, Dunn and Arbuckle (2001), Churchill (2004), Curran, Natilson and 
Young (2005), Fernando (2004), Fiori and Young (2005), Fitch (2007), Gonzalez-Vega and others (1996), 
Guzmán (1997), Jansson (2003), Larrain (2007), MacLean (2005), MIX  (various issues), Mugica (2004), 
Pérez Llanes  (2003), Westley (2004).
Table  15 (cont.)
Major Features of Selected MFIs in LAC
MFI Return 
on 
Portfolio 
(in %)
Write off 
Portfolio 
(in %)
Deposits 
to Loans 
(in %)
Legal Structure
BancoEstado 
Microempresas 
(BEME)
0.8 1.8 41.7
Service company within 
BancoEstado, a public institution
Bandesarrollo
1.6 1.2 22.1
Subsidiary of Banco del Desarrollo, 
a private commercial bank
Compartamos 
26.2 0.6 n.a.
Started in 1990 as a NGO. In 2001 
turned into a financial company and 
since 2006 into a bank (Banco 
Compartamos)
Banco Solidario 
(BancoSol)
3.2 0.2 89.2
It grew out of PRODEM, a NGO 
created in 1985 to become the first 
microcredit-centered commercial 
bank in the world
Banco Los 
Andes
1.5 0.6 71.0
It grew out of Pro-Crédito, a NGO 
launched in 1991 to become the 
first Fondo Financiero Privado 
(regulated under more lax requisites 
than banks). It is a bank since 2004.
CrediAmigo
16.6 0.9 n.a.
Internal unit of Banco do Nordeste, 
a public bank. 
Fomento a 
Iniciativas 
Económicas 
(FIE)
2.3 0.9 55.3
Started as a NGO and became a 
Fondo Financiero Privado in 1997.
Banco Caja 
Social
2.1 2.2 119.1
It became a formal commercial 
bank in 1991, although its sole 
shareholder is Fundación Social, a 
NGO.
Credife
1.1 n.a. n.a.
Service company within Banco del 
Pichincha, a private commercial 
bank
Mibanco
6.2 4.5 63.4
It started as a NGO under the name 
Acción Comunitaria del Perú, and 
transformed to a commercial bank 
in 1998.
Sources: Bicciato et al. (2002), Campion, Dunn and Arbuckle (2001), Churchill (2004), Curran, Natilson and 
Young (2005), Fernando (2004), Fiori and Young (2005), Fitch (2007), Gonzalez-Vega and others (1996), 
Guzmán (1997), Jansson (2003), Larrain (2007), MacLean (2005), MIX  (various issues), Mugica (2004), 
Pérez Llanes  (2003), Westley (2004).
Table 16
Some Major Microcredit-Supporting State Programs in LAC
Country Program Goal Total assistance
Subsidy to MFIs 
US$ 110 million (since 
inception in 2004)
Subsidy to MFIs 
US$ 1 million (since 
inception in 2004)
Fondo de Capital Social 
(FONCAP)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs - 
Second floor
US$ 5.8 million (since 
inception in 1997)
Fondo de Aval de Provincia 
de Buenos Aires  (FOGABA)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Subsidy to MFIs 
Loans to Microentrepreneurs - 
Second floor
Nacional Financiera Boliviana 
(NAFIBO)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs - 
Second floor
US$ 42 million (in 2005)
Servicio Brasileño de Apoyo a 
las Micro y Pequeñas 
Empresas (SEBRAE)
Subsidy to MFIs n.a.
Programa Nacional de 
Microcrédito Productivo 
Orientado  (PNMPO)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs
US$ 100 million (since 
inception in 2005)
Fondo de Aval para las Micro 
y Pequeñas Empresas  
(FAMPE)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Fondo de Aval para la 
Generación de Empleo y 
Renta  (FUNPROGER)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Fondo de Solidaridad e 
Inversión Social (FOSIS)
Subsidy to MFIs US$ 18 million (in 2006)
Servicios de Cooperación 
Tecnológica para Empresas 
de Menor Tamaño 
(SERCOTEC)
Subsidy to MFIS
US$ 234 million (since 
inception in 1952)
Instituto de Desarrollo 
Agropecuario (INDAP)
Subsidy to MFIs n.a.
Corporación de Fomento de 
la Producción (CORFO)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs US$ 11 million (in 2005)
Banco de Comercio Exterior 
de Colombia (BANCOLDEX)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs - 
Second floor
US$ 139 millon (in 2005)
Fondo Nacional de Garantías 
(FNG)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Subsidy to MFIs / Loans to 
Microentrepreneurs
Subsidy to MFIs / Loans to 
Microentrepreneurs
Sistema Nacional de 
Garantías (SNG)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Perú Emprendedor  Subsidy to MFIs n.a.
Fundación Fondo de Garantía 
para Préstamos a la Pequeña 
Industria (FOGAPI)
Guarantee fund for MFIs n.a.
Source: Curat,  Lupano and Gineste (2007).
ARGENTINA
MANOS A LA OBRA
BOLIVIA
Fondo de Desarrollo del 
Sistema Financiero y de 
Apoyo al Sector Productivo 
(FONDESIF)
MEXICO
Programa Nacional de 
Financiamiento al 
Microempresario 
(PRONAFIM)
US$ 633 million (since 
inception in 2001)
US$ 73 million (in 2005)
BRASIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
US$ 560 million (period 
2002-2004)PERÚ
Corporación Financiera de  
Desarrollo (COFIDE)
Loans to Microentrepreneurs - 
Second floor
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